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Abstract The paper investigates the dynamics of a model of sentiment switching. The model
is built upon rumor propagation theory and it is designed to uncover, for a given population,
the social process through which optimistic individuals might become pessimistic or the other
way around. The outcome is a scenario of perpetual motion with the shares of optimistic and
pessimistic agents varying persistently over time. On a second stage, the cyclical sentiments
setup is attached to a mechanism of formation of expectations based on the notion of optimized
rationality, leading to a description of the macro economy in which aggregate output and infla-
tion exhibit sentiment driven fluctuations. The proposed model contributes to a recent strand
of macroeconomic literature that recovers the Keynesian notions of animal spirits, market senti-
ments and waves of optimism and pessimism.
Keywords sentiments, animal spirits, business cycles, rumor propagation, New-Keynesian
macroeconomics, optimized rationality
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1. Introduction
This paper merges two strands of scientific literature with the objective of offering
a behavioral interpretation about observed aggregate business fluctuations. The here
relevant lines of thought include, on one hand, the recent contributions on the macroe-
conomic role of animal spirits and, on the other hand, rumor spreading theory, a widely
debated theme in various disciplinary fields and a theme that can be easily adapted to
a setting of sentiment propagation.
The first part of the paper describes the dynamics of sentiment switching. The
sources of sentiment changes reside exclusively on social interaction and, therefore,
this is a model of pure animal spirits where features outside the scope of the economy
(as confidence, fairness, antisocial behavior, and other behavioral elements mentioned
in detail in Akerlof and Shiller 2009) determine the mood with which agents face
economic decisions. In a second stage, sentiment dynamics are integrated into a base-
line macro model. Particularly, the New-Keynesian macroeconomic framework, that
involves a dynamic IS equation, the New-Keynesian Phillips curve and a monetary po-
licy Taylor rule, is used to this end. In the proposed setting, waves of optimism and
pessimism will determine economic outcomes by exacerbating the fluctuations caused
by random shocks and by contributing to generate well defined periods of expansion
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and recession in the economy.
A relevant feature of the setup is that adding sentiment changes to the model of
the aggregate economy will require a departure from pure rational expectations and
the adoption of an optimized rationality procedure, according to which agents have to
weigh whether the effort and the cost of collecting information to generate an accurate
forecast is compensated by the benefits of producing such correct forecast. In the pres-
ence of information acquisition costs, rational expectations are replaced by a heuristic
rule under which agents believe macroeconomic variables will approach the defined
policy target (if they are optimistic) or depart from such target (if they are pessimistic).
The results and the discussion in this paper are aligned with what the latest and most
influential research in macroeconomics suggests. The reader will be able to identify a
strong coincidence between the main ideas that will be put forward and the arguments
advanced, for instance, in the conclusion of the paper by Angeletos et al. (2015, p. 25):
“By relying on a particular solution concept together with complete infor-
mation, standard macroeconomic models impose a rigid structure on how
agents form beliefs about endogenous economic outcomes and how they
coordinate their actions. In this paper, by contrast, (. . . ) we augmented
DSGE models with a tractable form of higher-order belief dynamics that
(. . . ) captures a certain kind of waves of optimism and pessimism about
the short-term outlook of the economy. We believe that this adds to our
understanding of business-cycle phenomena (. . . ).”
And they continue (Angeletos et al. 2015, p. 26):
“These findings naturally raise the question of where the drop in confi-
dence during a recession, or more generally the waves of optimism and
pessimism in the agents’ beliefs about one another’s actions come from.
Having treated the ‘confidence shock’ as exogenous, we can not offer
a meaningful answer to this question. This limitation, however, is not
specific to what we do in this paper: any formal model must ultimately
attribute the business cycle to some exogenous trigger, whether this is
a technology shock, a discount-rate shock, a financial shock, or even a
sunspot.”
While agreeing with the first statement, that systematic shocks on sentiments help
in understanding business cycles, the analysis in this paper goes deeper in the sense that
instead of treating sentiment fluctuations as completely exogenous and inexpugnable, it
offers an explanation for waves of animal spirits that is supported on social interaction
across agents holding different ‘views of the world’.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 undertakes a brief
tour across the relevant literature. Section 3 adapts the rumor spreading framework to
allow for the possibility of changing sentiments. In Section 4, it is shown how a slight
and reasonable change in the proposed setup can result into everlasting oscillations in
the shares of optimists and pessimists. Section 5 introduces the optimized rationality
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concept and describes how optimistic and pessimistic agents form expectations. Sec-
tion 6 applies the previously presented expectation rules to a New-Keynesian bench-
mark model, revealing that the setup is adequate to explain business-cycle persistence.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. The literature: a brief tour
2.1 Animal spirits and contemporaneous macroeconomic thought
Mainstream economic theory bases most of its analysis on a strict notion of rationality.
Because agents are, allegedly, capable of optimally processing available information,
aggregate fluctuations are interpreted as the mere outcome of the response of utility
maximizing agents to supply side shocks. This interpretation on the sources of business
cycles is not unanimous; in fact, in the last few years, an increasing number of macroe-
conomists began exploring different routes. The turning point can be traced back to
Kocherlakota (2010) who, with an insightful reflection about the state of macroeco-
nomics, was able to convince the scientific community that the frequency and depth of
observed business fluctuations cannot be explained solely on the basis of exogenous
shocks on technology, preferences or policy. Surely, other drivers of aggregate cyclical
motion exist.
The quest for such drivers has led macroeconomists to recover and focus attention
on some Keynesian notions and ideas, namely those attached to market sentiments,
animal spirits and other psychological factors that shape the decision-making process
of economic agents. The issue is not whether these notions are relevant to characterize
human behavior (they certainly are!), but how one can integrate them in the benchmark
macro models without losing the relevant contribution that the dynamic stochastic ge-
neral equilibrium framework currently gives for the understanding of the functioning
of the aggregate economy.
Meaningful studies going on the direction mentioned in the above paragraphs in-
clude De Grauwe (2011, 2012), Milani (2011), Bidder and Smith (2012), Franke
(2012), Angeletos and La’O (2013), Bofinger et al. (2013) and Lengnick and Wohlt-
mann (2013). Although the adopted approaches differ, the cited references all share a
desire to incorporate a behavioral component into the macro theory of short-run fluc-
tuations.
In De Grauwe (2011, 2012), Bofinger et al. (2013) and Lengnick and Wohltmann
(2013), it is considered that economic agents use simple rules, called heuristics, in
order to predict future values of relevant macro variables, in the context of the New-
Keynesian macro model. Combining these heuristics with an evolutionary approach
that contemplates a discrete choice selection mechanism, this class of models triggers
the generation of endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism that allow to repli-
cate with a reasonable degree of precision observable business cycles. Two points
about this approach are worth stressing. First, animal spirits are viewed as a way to
guarantee the existence of a true decentralization in market decisions; under rational
expectations, agents are identical, endowed with unlimited cognitive capabilities and,
therefore, there must be a coincidence between decentralized decisions and the choices
106 Czech Economic Review, vol. 9, no. 2
Sentiment Cyclicality
of a representative agent. Animal spirits open the door to behavior heterogeneity and
to a richer set of potential outcomes. Second, as emphasized by Paul DeGrauwe, one
must be careful about the way in which departures relatively to full rationality are intro-
duced into macro models; it is necessary to avoid that everything becomes possible, as
the result of assumptions that are, eventually, unreasonable and hard to reconcile with
a rigorous scientific analysis. In this specific context, it is claimed that the mentioned
problem is solved once the evolutionary learning process is attached to the model.
The strategy followed by Milani (2011) is different. The New-Keynesian model
is, again, used to discuss departures from full rationality and from the formation of
purely rational expectations, however the approach is now based on an explicit learning
device. Agents directly exploit historical series with the goal of understanding the true
law of motion of the relevant economic indicators. As they collect information they
will learn, but this learning process might not be immaculate, in the sense that it might
not lead to a convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium. Instead, waves of
optimism and pessimism might subsist over time.
In Bidder and Smith (2012), the motivation is the same, i.e., to highlight the im-
portance of animal spirits in the analysis of macroeconomic phenomena, but the psy-
chological driver of the departure from strict rationality differs from the previously
mentioned. Specifically, the sentiment waves are the outcome of a peculiar behavioral
aspect which is the fear of model misspecification. Agents have knowledge on the true
model of the economy but they are concerned with the possibility of such model being
distorted in some way, leading to an overly pessimistic interpretation of the reality. In
Franke (2012), rational expectations are, once more, set aside, in this case in favor of
a forecasting mechanism based on the use of an average opinion index built upon the
revealed sentiments of the population. This study furnishes a micro foundation for the
presence of animal spirits in the macro economy, which incorporates a herding com-
ponent, and emphasizes the cyclical nature of the trajectories followed by the macro
variables in the specified scenario.
Finally, Angeletos and La’O (2013) also propose a business cycle theory, con-
structed in turn of the notions of animal spirits and market sentiments. These authors,
however, intentionally preserve rational expectations. They introduce a communica-
tion constraint by assuming that trade is random and decentralized. This is all that is
required to generate waves of optimism and pessimism in a model that, otherwise, is of
a neoclassical nature. Trading frictions that limit communication are the key element,
in this view, underlying the formation of animal spirits. This study accommodates mar-
ket sentiments and self-fulfilling beliefs in macro theory without abandoning rational
expectations, competitive markets and equilibrium uniqueness.
2.2 From rumors to sentiments
Sentiments of optimism and pessimism arise in the mind of the individuals most of
the times as the outcome of a social interaction process, in which positive and nega-
tive feelings are shared across a given population. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
associate sentiment switching processes to the literature on rumor spreading, namely
the part of this literature that characterizes the propagation of rumors in a similar way
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relatively to the modeling of infectious diseases. Such contributions go back to Da-
ley and Kendall (1964, 1965) and Maki and Thompson (1973), who have made the
first relevant characterization of a rumor spreading mechanism. In the last few years a
clear resurgence of this theme emerged, with meaningful extensions of the basic model
being presented.
The benchmark rumor propagation model classifies individual agents into three
categories: susceptible, spreaders and stiflers. Susceptible individuals are those who
ignore the rumor but may be ‘infected’ when entering in contact with someone who
knows the rumor. Spreaders are the ones that have acquired knowledge on the rumor
and transmit it to others. And stiflers are the individuals who know the rumor, have
spread it in the past, but no longer propagate it (see, e.g., Cintron-Arias, 2006, for a
basic version of the model).
The rumor setup has evolves essentially in two directions. A first group of authors,
including Thompson et al. (2003), Huo et al. (2012), Zhao et al. (2012) and Wang et
al. (2013), have introduced changes on the typology of agents participating in the ru-
mor spreading process, namely including passive and active individuals (who differ in
their propensity to contact others), and on the nature of the relations, through the con-
sideration of trust mechanisms, forgetting and remembering processes and incubation
periods.
A second group of changes over the original model relates to the structure of in-
teraction. In the original framework, the topology of the underlying social interaction
network across which the rumor spreads is overlooked, i.e., it is implicitly assumed
that we are in the presence of a homogeneously mixing population: anyone can in-
teract with another agent and these meetings occur randomly. Pastor-Santorras and
Vespignani (2004) and Nekovee et al. (2007) approach the rumor spreading problem in
scenarios of complex social networks; specifically, they analyze rumor propagation in
the following types of networks: random graphs, uncorrelated scale-free networks and
scale-free networks with assortative degree correlations. Similarly, Zanette (2002) ap-
plies rumor propagation to a specific network topology, namely small-world networks,
which are social networks that are highly clustered and for which the distance between
any two nodes is on average very small as compared to the total number of nodes and
links.
First built with the purpose of characterizing a simple process of rumor spreading
in a homogeneously mixing population, the rumor propagation model has been, as
described, sophisticated in various directions that, basically, have added new types of
agents and have alerted to the need of exploring more complex interaction scenarios.
The framework is also useful, as we shall see, to approach sentiment switching.
In our specific setting, in which agents are exposed to sentiments of optimism and
pessimism, an optimistic agent may be susceptible to turn into a pessimist if she enters
in contact with an agent in the other category. In that case, she eventually becomes
a spreader of the pessimistic feeling and, after a given period of time, she is likely
to turn into a stifler. Pessimistic stiflers will then, eventually, become susceptible of
turning optimistic again, and this process will tend to repeat itself endlessly. As a
result, the proposed model of social interaction implies a circular flow on the motion
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of the shares of optimistic and pessimistic individuals, for the assumed population.
Under reasonable and logical conditions, this flow of individuals from one group to
the other may be such that the number of optimists and pessimists does not remain
constant over time. In fact, we will show that it might fluctuate endlessly, following a
cyclical movement.
3. Sentiment switching
3.1 The rumor propagation framework
Consider a discrete notion of time, t = 0,1, . . ., and a population of individuals orga-
nized under the form of a homogeneous social interaction network. This network is
composed by nodes and by links connecting the nodes. It is assumed that each node
j has an identical number of k links to other nodes; for simplicity, we will normalize
the value of k to 1. In the context of rumor propagation, each node j in the network
corresponds to an individual that may belong, at date t, to one of three categories:
susceptible or ignorants, spreaders and stiflers; the respective shares are xt , yt and zt .
In Nekovee et al. (2007), it is demonstrated how interacting Markov chains and the
law of mass action can be used to represent the dynamics of the interaction process. In
a k= 1 homogeneous network, in which a meeting between an ignorant and a spreader
triggers a transition of the ignorant to the spreader state with probability λ ∈ (0,1], and
a meeting between a spreader and another spreader or a stifler implies a transition of
the first to the stifler state with probability σ ∈ (0,1], such dynamics are presentable
under the form of a system of three difference equations: xt+1− xt =−λxtytyt+1− yt = λxtyt −σyt(yt + zt)zt+1− zt = σyt(yt + zt) (1)
The 3-dimensional system (1) can be displayed in a compact 2-D form, given that
xt + yt + zt = 1. Selecting variables xt and yt as the endogenous variables of the new
system, it comes: 
xt+1− xt =−λxtyt
yt+1− yt = [(λ +σ)−σxt ]yt (2)
Despite its apparent simplicity, system (2) encloses an intricate dynamic behavior.
The single substantive feature one draws from the respective analysis is that the num-
ber of spreaders falls to zero as time goes to infinity. The steady-state distribution of
individuals across the categories of ignorants and stiflers is not determinable in generic
form, because such allocation will be dependent on the initial state (x0,y0,z0). When
linearizing system (2) in the vicinity of a hypothetical steady-state point, one observes
that one of the eigenvalues of the respective Jacobian matrix is equal to 1, and there-
fore the system rests over a bifurcation line, delivering an unconventional transitional
dynamics outcome.
Rumor spreading studies tend to distinguish between two kinds of equilibria (see,
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Fig.1: Time trajectories of the shares of susceptible, spreader and stifler individuals 
(=0.25, = 1/3) 
Fig.2: Sentiment-switching dynamics (example 1) 
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Figure 1. Time trajectories of the shares of susceptible, spreader and stifler individuals
(λ = 0.25, σ = 0.33)
e.g., Huo et al. 2012). The rumor-free equilibrium corresponds to the case where
(x∗,y∗,z∗) = (1,0,0). This occurs, under the presented specification, only for λ = 0,
i.e., when the rate of rumor spreading is zero. All other possible steady-state results
can be designated rumor-endemic equilibria; these results are such that (x∗,y∗,z∗) =
(x∗,0,1− x∗), ∀λ ,σ ∈ (0,1).1
Figure 1 displays the typical trajectories of xt , yt and zt . The figure is drawn for
λ = 0.25 and σ = 1/3. At the starting date, almost all individuals are ignorant about
the rumor; a single spreader is necessary to begin the rumor’s dissemination. As time
unfolds, the share of susceptible ignorants falls, the number of spreaders increases and
some spreaders start changing to the stifler position. After a given threshold, the share
of spreaders begins to fall, as the passage of spreaders to stiflers turns stronger than the
transition from the susceptible state to the spreader state. In the long-term, all spreaders
switch to stiflers and the population will be grouped into two classes: those who never
heard the rumor, x∗, and those that know the ru or, have spread it in the past but no
longer disseminate it, z∗.
The rumor propagation model, as described above, is sufficiently flexible to be
adapted in a multiplicity of directions. In what follows, the model is modified and
transformed in a framework where waves of optimism and pessimism may be subject
to discussion.
3.2 The sentiment propagation framework
In this subsection, the above rumor propagation apparatus is adapted to deal with sen-
timents that might influence the aggregate outcome of economic relations. Only two
types of sentiments are allowed for, namely optimism and pessimism. The share of
optimistic agents will be denoted by ωt ; the share of pessimists is 1−ωt . Now, six
1 See Piqueira (2010) for further insights on the study of the transitional dynamics of the benchmark rumor
propagation model.
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categories of agents will populate the economy:
(i) Optimists susceptible of being ‘infected’ with a negative feeling: xωt .
(ii) Spreaders of negative feelings: y1−ωt . These are previous optimists, who were
‘infected’ with a negative sentiment and start spreading it.
(iii) Stiflers ‘infected’ with a negative sentiment: z1−ωt . This part of the population
is composed by previous optimists, that became spreaders of a negative feeling
and that continue to be pessimists after they stop spreading the rumor underlying
such sentiment.
(iv) Pessimists susceptible of being ‘infected’ with a positive feeling: x1−ωt .
(v) Spreaders of positive sentiments: yωt .
(vi) Stiflers who are optimists: zωt .
All the shares presented in the previous list respect to percentages of the whole
population and, therefore, xωt + y
ω
t + z
ω
t + x
1−ω
t + y
1−ω
t + z
1−ω
t = 1. From the stated
arguments, it also follows that ωt ≡ xωt + yωt + zωt and 1−ωt ≡ x1−ωt + y1−ωt + z1−ωt .
A model similar to the plain ignorant-spreader-stifler paradigm of the last subsec-
tion can be adapted to this new setting. The main difference is that now we have a
closed circuit, where two types of states are achievable: at each time moment, agents
can only be one of two things: optimists or pessimists. The implementation of the
idea of a closed circuit requires one further assumption: stiflers (both optimists and
pessimists) become susceptible of being infected with the opposite feeling, with a pro-
bability θ ∈ (0,1). The relevant system of difference equations is now a 6-dimensional
system, although one of the dimensions can be suppressed because the sum of the
endogenous variables is equal to 1. The list of equations is:
xωt+1− xωt =−λωxωt y1−ωt +θωzωt
y1−ωt+1 − y1−ωt = λωxωt y1−ωt −σωy1−ωt

y1−ωt + z1−ωt

z1−ωt+1 − z1−ωt = σωy1−ωt

y1−ωt + z1−ωt
−θ1−ωz1−ωt
x1−ωt+1 − x1−ωt =−λ1−ωx1−ωt yωt +θ1−ωz1−ωt
yωt+1− yωt = λ1−ωx1−ωt yωt −σ1−ωyωt (yωt + zωt )
zωt+1− zωt = σ1−ωyωt (yωt + zωt )−θωzωt
(3)
In system (3), we have allowed for the possibility of different rates λ , σ and θ for
the spreading of each of the two types of sentiments. As we will see below, considering
that they are identical simplifies the analysis of the steady-state results. In order to
maintain the analysis at a general level, for now we assume that they might differ.
Steady-state properties of (3) significantly diverge from what one has characterized
concerning (1). In the current case, steady-state results are independent of the initial
state and might, under particular conditions, be explicitly presented. Furthermore, the
steady-state values, including the shares of spreaders, are all non-zero values, meaning
that we have a dynamic steady-state: there will always be, at each period t, a portion
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of agents who spread negative sentiments and a portion of agents who spread positive
sentiments. This is the direct outcome of our closed circuit assumption, that makes
optimists converted to pessimists to become susceptible of being again ‘infected’ with
an optimistic sentiment.
Let vt+1 =V (vt), with v= (xω ,yω ,zω ,x1−ω ,y1−ωz1−ω), be a compact representa-
tion of the system of difference equations (3) and define E = {v∗ : v∗−V (v∗) = 0} as
the set of steady-state values attached to this group of equations.
Proposition 1. The steady-state equilibrium point v∗ ∈ E exists and it is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
One should remark that the steady-state point is unique under the assumption that
rumor-free equilibria are excluded from the analysis, i.e., that at least one of the follo-
wing conditions holds: yω0 6= 0 or y1−ω0 6= 0.
Although one cannot determine v∗ explicitly for generic values of the various rates
involved in the analysis, this becomes possible under constraint λ ≡ λω = λ1−ω , σ ≡
σω = σ1−ω , θ ≡ θω = θ1−ω . In this case, the following result is derived.
Proposition 2. For common parameter values θ , λ , σ , the steady-state point v∗ cor-
responds to vector  x∗y∗
z∗
=

σ
2(σ+λ )
θλ
2θ(σ+λ )+λσ
λ 2σ
2(σ+λ )[2θ(σ+λ )+λσ ]
 ,
where x∗ ≡ (xω)∗ = x1−ω∗; y∗ ≡ (yω)∗ = y1−ω∗; z∗ ≡ (zω)∗ = z1−ω∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
If variables in vector v∗ converge to the steady-state, then the shares of optimistic
and pessimistic agents will remain constant after the transient phase is completed. In
the long-term there will exist six classes of individuals: those who are optimists (pes-
simists) and ignore any rumor that can change their sentiments, those who are pes-
simists (optimists) and spread this sentiment, and those who are pessimists (optimists),
do not spread the sentiment and are not susceptible of being ‘infected’ by the other
sentiment.
Figures 2 and 3 display illustrative time trajectories for the dynamics of the senti-
ment-switching model for specific values of parameters. For the construction of Fi-
gure 2, it is assumed λω = λ1−ω = 0.25; σω = σ1−ω = 1/3; θω = θ1−ω = 0.05. The
upper panel presents the time trajectories of the six categories of agents; as one ob-
serves, the values of variables oscillate around the steady-state as they approach it.
Furthermore, compared with Figure 1, it is evident that the number of spreaders, for
each class of sentiment, never falls to zero; as spreaders become stiflers, some previ-
ously susceptible individuals become spreaders. This dynamic process is possible be-
cause the susceptible category continuously receives individuals that no longer spread
the respective sentiment. Note, as well, that, according to the result in Proposition 2,
values of x∗, y∗ and z∗ are identical for both sentiments. The lower panel represents
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Fig.1: Time trajectories of the shares of susceptible, spreader and stifler individuals 
(=0.25, = 1/3) 
Fig.2: Sentiment-switching dynamics (example 1) 
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Fig.2: Sentiment-switching dynamics (example 1) 
Lower panel: optimists-pessimists time trajectories 
Fig.3: Sentiment-switching dynamics (example 2) 
Upper panel: susceptible-spreaders-stiflers time trajectories 
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Optimists-pessimists time trajectories
Figure 2. Sentiment-switching dynamics (λω = λ1−ω = 0.25; σω = σ1−ω = 0.33;
θω = θ1−ω = 0.05)
the shares of optimists and pessimists; the symmetry triggered by the coincidence in
parameter values implies that ω∗ = 1−ω∗ = 0.5.
Figure 3 is generated for different parameter values of the various rates under
each sentiment. In particular, the example takes λω = 0.25; λ1−ω = 0.3, σω = 1/3;
σ1−ω = 0.5; θω = 0.05; θ1−ω = 0.1. Differences in parameters annulate the steady-
state symmetry and make the number of optimists differ, in the long-run, relatively to
the number of pessimists. In this particular case, ω∗ = 0.46068, 1−ω∗ = 0.53932.
4. The cyclicality mechanism
Sentiment switching, as characterized in the previous section, generates time series for
the shares of optimists and pessimists that exhibit an oscillatory movement. As time
unfolds, however, such cycles tend to diminish their intensity and fade away as the val-
ues of variables converge to their steady-state positions. In this section, we introduce
an additional assumption, which allows for the cyclical motion of the sentiment shares
to be perpetuated in time.
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Fig.3: Sentiment-switching dynamics (example 2) 
Lower panel: optimists-pessimists time trajectories 
Fig.4: Sentiment cycles (example 1) 
Upper panel: susceptible-spreaders-stifles time trajectories 
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Figure 3. Sentiment-switching dynamics (λω = 0.25; λ1−ω = 0.3, σω = 0.33; σ1−ω = 0.5;
θω = 0.05; θ1−ω = 0.1)
The new assumption requires maintaining the values of parameters σω , σ1−ω ,
θω and θ1−ω constant, but to allow λω and λ1−ω to take different values in two differ-
ent circumstances. Specifically, we consider that the groups of susceptible agents are
able to observe the rates of infection and to separate two cases, the one in which the
growth rate of sentiment spreading is non negative and the opposite case. Susceptible
agents will react as follows:
(i) If the growth rate at which optimistic/pessimistic sentiments are spread is posi-
tive or zero, then the rate at which pessimists/optimists are infected with a posi-
tive/negative sentiment is high;
(ii) If the growth rate at which optimistic/pessimistic sentiments are spread is nega-
tive, then the rate at which pessimists/optimists are infected with a positive/nega-
tive sentiment is low.
This mechanism translates the idea that the str ngth of sentiment spreading influ-
ences how susceptible the susceptible individuals are. They are more susceptible if
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Figure 4. Sentiment cycles (λω0 = λ
1−ω
0 = 0.1; λ
ω
1 = λ
1−ω
1 = 0.25; σω = σ1−ω = 0.33;
θω = θ1−ω = 0.05 )
the sentiment is propagating at an increasing rate. Analytically, the described process
might be formulated in the following form:
λ1−ω,t =

λ 1−ω0 if γ
ω
t−1 < 0
λ 1−ω1 if γ
ω
t−1 ≥ 0
, γωt =

yωt − yωt−1

/yωt−1, λ
1−ω
0 < λ
1−ω
1
and
λω,t =

λω0 if γ
1−ω
t−1 < 0
λω1 if γ
1−ω
t−1 ≥ 0
, γ1−ωt =

y1−ωt − y1−ωt−1

/y1−ωt−1 , λ
ω
0 < λ
ω
1
The reaction of susceptible individuals to the observed spreading rate triggers a
perpetual cyclical movement on the shares of ignorants, spreaders and stiflers for both
pessimists and optimists and, a a result, the number of optimists and pessimists will
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Fig. 6: Output gap time trajectory (g=0) 
(sentiment propagation example 1) 
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Figure 5. Sentiment cycles (λω0 = λ
1−ω
0 = 0.1; λ
ω
1 = 0.25; λ
1−ω
1 = 0.3; σω = 0.33;
σ1−ω = 0.5; θω = 0.05; θ1−ω = 0.1 )
be continuously changing. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this process for the same array of
parameter values σω , σ1−ω , θω and θ1−ω as the one used to draw Figures 2 and 3. The
only change is in the values of λ ; now, we take λω0 = λ
1−ω
0 = 0.1, λ
ω
1 = λ
1−ω
1 = 0.25,
in the first case, and λω0 = λ
1−ω
0 = 0.1, λ
ω
1 = 0.25, λ
1−ω
1 = 0.3 in the second case.
The adaptation of the rumor propagation model to the sentiment-switching process
with a cyclicality mechanism exemplifies how sentiments of optimism and pessimism
might spread regardless from economic conditions. There are periods in which the ma-
jority of the agents adopts an optimistic view of the world just because this sentiment
is being propagated faster than the opposite sentiment. Under the proposed process,
this situation tends to be reversed after some time periods, making pess istic feel-
ings to dominate in a given time interval; then, optimistic feelings take over again as
dominant, and this process continues indefinitely.
Now that we have described the mechanism of aggregate mood swings that occur
in a context of social interaction, next sections will integrate this behavioral process
into a simple macro model.
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5. Optimistic and pessimistic expectations
Sentiments might play a fundamental role on the process of formation of expectations,
namely when some kind of departure relatively to the benchmark of rational expecta-
tions is considered, i.e., when some sort of bounded rationality is taken into account.
Effectively, in order to proceed with the analysis it is now introduced a less than per-
fect forecasting rule. At this respect, we follow Brock et al. (2006), Dudek (2010) and
Gomes (2012), who consider a device of ’optimized rationality’, according to which
the information required to form educated expectations is costly and agents have to
weigh the benefits of generating accurate expectations against the cost associated to
the acquisition and to the treatment of relevant information.
Agents will be interested in forming expectations about two variables: the inflation
rate, pit , and the output gap, gt . Agents ignore, at period t, the values these variables
will take in the subsequent period, t+ 1, but they can collect information in order to
improve the reliability of the expectations. Information acquisition is costly. Each
individual may acquire a predictor of a given quality; the better the quality, the more
it will cost. When purchasing a predictor of quality qt ∈ (0,1), the individual will
be acquiring a signal vt . The exact shape of the signal depends on the type of agent,
optimistic or pessimistic, one is considering. Specifically, the following signals are
available to be acquired:
(i) Signal on future inflation, acquired by an optimistic agent:
vω,pit =

pit+1, with probability qω,pit
pit − ε(pit −pi), with probability 1−qω,pit , ε > 0 (4)
When acquiring, at period t, a signal vω,pit , through the purchase of a predictor of
quality qω,pit , one of two outcomes is possible: the signal will reveal the true value of
the inflation rate with a probability qω,pit ; the same signal will be totally uninformative
with a probability 1−qω,pit . An uninformed agent will make the following forecast for
the inflation rate at period t+ 1: because the agent is optimistic, she will believe that
the inflation rate will converge towards a socially known and accepted target value pi .
This target might be, for instance, the objective set by the central bank to guarantee
price stability. Hence, the expectation formed by the optimistic agent regarding future
inflation is
Eωt

pit+1|vω,pit

= qω,pit pit+1+

1−qω,pit

[pit − ε(pit −pi)] . (5)
(ii) Signal on future inflation, acquired by a pessimistic agent:
v1−ω,pit =

pit+1, with probability q1−ω,pit
pit + ε(pit −pi), with probability 1−q1−ω,pit
(6)
A pessimistic agent, as an optimistic one, will be capable of predicting the true
value of the inflation rate with a probability that corresponds directly to the quality of
the predictor. However, if the agent is unable to produce the accurate forecast, what
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occurs with a probability 1−q1−ω,pit , then she will take the pessimistic attitude, which
is, in this case, to believe that the inflation rate will diverge from the target value. The
same parameter ε is considered in (4) and (6) in order to maintain a symmetry between
the behavior of optimists and pessimists. In this case, the individual expectation is
E1−ωt

pit+1|v1−ω,pit

= q1−ω,pit pit+1+

1−q1−ω,pit

[pit + ε(pit −pi)] . (7)
Signals with a similar structure can be built for the output gap. Let g be the target
defined by public authorities for this aggregate and recognized by the population as
such; denote by η the rate at which uninformed agents expect a convergence (if they
are optimists) or a divergence (if they are pessimists) relatively to the respective target
value.
(iii) Signal on future output gap, acquired by an optimistic agent:
vω,gt =

gt+1, with probability q
ω,g
t
gt −η(gt −g), with probability 1−qω,gt , η > 0 (8)
(iv) Signal on future output gap, acquired by a pessimistic agent:
v1−ω,gt =

gt+1, with probability q
1−ω,g
t
gt +η(gt −g), with probability 1−q1−ω,gt
(9)
The respective expectations are:
Eωt

gt+1|vω,gt

= qω,gt gt+1+

1−qω,gt

[gt −η(gt −g)] (10)
E1−ωt

gt+1|v1−ω,gt

= q1−ω,gt gt+1+

1−q1−ω,gt

[gt +η(gt −g)] (11)
Next, we must approach how probabilities reflecting the quality of the signal are
determined. At each date t, agents intend to purchase an optimal predictor, i.e., a
predictor that delivers the best possible balance between the accuracy of the forecast
and the minimization of information acquisition and processing costs. In this case,
optimists and pessimists will, respectively, solve the following optimality problems:
min
qω,pit ,q
ω,g
t
Uωt =
1
2

Eωt

pit+1|vω,pit
−pit+12+ (12)
+
1
2
a

Eωt

gt+1|vω,gt
−gt+12+Cqω,pit ,qω,gt  ,
and
min
q1−ω,pit ,q
1−ω,g
t
U1−ωt =
1
2

E1−ωt

pit+1|v1−ω,pit

−pit+1
2
+ (13)
+
1
2
a

E1−ωt

gt+1|v1−ω,gt

−gt+1
2
+C

q1−ω,pit ,q
1−ω,g
t

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In (12) and (13), parameter a > 0 represents the weight given to output stabilization
relatively to price stability in the agents’ objective functions, and functions C(·) trans-
late the costs of acquisition of each one of the predictors. Convex cost functions are
taken:
C(qω,pit ,q
ω,g
t ) =
1
2
ψ

qω,pit
2
+

qω,gt
2 , ψ ≥ 0 (14)
C(q1−ω,pit ,q
1−ω,g
t ) =
1
2
ψ

q1−ω,pit
2
+

q1−ω,gt
2
(15)
The solutions of problems (12) and (13) are:
∂Uωt
∂qω,pit
= 0 ⇔ qω,pit =
[pit+1−pit + ε(pit −pi)]2
ψ+[pit+1−pit + ε(pit −pi)]2
(16)
∂U1−ωt
∂q1−ω,pit
= 0 ⇔ q1−ω,pit =
[pit+1−pit − ε(pit −pi)]2
ψ+[pit+1−pit − ε(pit −pi)]2
(17)
∂Uωt
∂qω,gt
= 0 ⇔ qω,gt =
a [gt+1−gt +η(gt −g)]2
ψ+a [gt+1−gt +η(gt −g)]2
(18)
∂U1−ωt
∂q1−ω,gt
= 0 ⇔ q1−ω,gt =
a [gt+1−gt −η(gt −g)]2
ψ+a [gt+1−gt −η(gt −g)]2
(19)
Optimal predictors (16) to (19) reflect the importance of information acquisition
costs in forming expectations. Costless information (ψ = 0) implies q = 1 for every
predictor, meaning that perfect foresight prevails. As the value of the cost parameter
increases, the quality of the signal will fall and the perfect foresight outcome becomes
progressively less probable. Although it is possible to compute optimal predictors, as
presented above, these depend on future values of the inflation rate and of the output
gap that are not known at date t (the predictors are used precisely because such values
are not known with anticipation!). To circumvent this obstacle, various approaches are
possible; Brock et al. (2006), for instance, resort to the concept of managerial perfect
foresight equilibrium, while Dudek (2010) considers the possibility of computing an
average of all the available signals. The approach we follow is simpler; it is considered
that agents know the perfect foresight steady-state (pi,g) and, in order to save effort and
cognitive resources, they adopt a constant in time predictor where observable values of
variables give place to the perfect foresight steady-state values. The inflation rate and
the output gap (pi,g) depend on the specific macro structure of the economy.2 For an
economy that is hypothetically resting in the defined steady-state, predictors (16) and
(17) are identical,
qω,pi = q1−ω,pi = [ε(pi−pi)]2
ψ+[ε(pi−pi)]2 , (20)
2 These values are presented, in explicit form, in the next section, for the New-Keynesian model.
Czech Economic Review, vol. 9, no. 2 119
O. Gomes
qω,g = q1−ω,g = a [η(g−g)]2
ψ+a [η(g−g)]2 . (21)
Reconsider now expectations (5), (7), (10) and (11). By replacing the predictor
values (16) and (17) in them, one obtains explicit expressions for each of the relevant
expectations,
Eωt

pit+1|vω,pit

=
[ε(pi−pi)]2pit+1+ψ [pit − ε (pit −pi)]
ψ+[ε(pi−pi)]2 , (22)
E1−ωt

pit+1|v1−ω,pit

=
[ε(pi−pi)]2pit+1+ψ [pit + ε (pit −pi)]
ψ+[ε(pi−pi)]2 , (23)
Eωt

gt+1|vω,gt

=
a [η(g−g)]2 gt+1+ψ [gt −η (gt −g)]
ψ+a [η(g−g)]2 , (24)
E1−ωt

gt+1|v1−ω,gt

=
a [η(g−g)]2 gt+1+ψ [gt +η (gt −g)]
ψ+a [η(g−g)]2 . (25)
Observe, for expectations (22) to (25), that the absence of information costs implies a
return to perfect foresight, i.e.,ψ = 0⇒ Eωt

pit+1|vω,pit

=E1−ωt

pit+1|v1−ω,pit

= pit+1
and Eωt

gt+1|vω,gt

= E1−ωt

gt+1|v1−ω,gt

= gt+1.
Since we are interested in dealing with aggregate expectations, we have to com-
pute the weighted average expectations in the economy. Given the shares of optimists
and pessimists that populate the economy at date t, computed according to what was
established in Section 4, such expectations are
Et(pit+1) = ωtEωt

pit+1|vω,pit

+(1−ωt)E1−ωt

pit+1|v1−ω,pit

, (26)
Et(gt+1) = ωtEωt

gt+1|vω,gt

+(1−ωt)E1−ωt

gt+1|v1−ω,gt

. (27)
The final expressions of the inflation rate and of the output gap expectations are
obtained by replacing (22) and (23) into (26), and (24) and (25) into (27). They are,
Et(pit+1) =
[ε(pi−pi)]2pit+1+ψ [pit + ε(1−2ωt)(pit −pi)]
ψ+[ε(pi−pi)]2 , (28)
Et(gt+1) =
a [η(g−g)]2 gt+1+ψ [gt +η(1−2ωt)(gt −g)]
ψ+a [η(g−g)]2 . (29)
Note, also on the aggregate level, that if ψ = 0, then Et(pit+1) = pit+1 and Et(gt+1) =
gt+1.
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6. Application to the New-Keynesian macro model
In this section, a characterization of the long-term dynamics of the New-Keynesian
model is undertaken, taking into account expectation formation rules (28) and (29). We
consider a reduced form of the model, which contemplates two difference equations,
describing the demand-side and the supply-side of the economy.3 The two equations
are a dynamic IS curve that establishes the common opposite sign relation between the
real interest rate, rt , and the output gap,
gt =−ϕrt +Et(gt+1)+µt , ϕ > 0, (30)
and a New-Keynesian Phillips curve,
pit = κgt +βEt(pit+1)+υt , κ,β ∈ (0,1). (31)
Parameter β is the discount factor and κ measures the degree of price stickiness; the
lower the value of κ , the stickier prices are. Variables µt and υt correspond to white
noise disturbances that influence, respectively, demand and supply. The real interest
rate is given by the Fisher equation, rt = it−Et(pit+1), with it the nominal interest rate;
and monetary policy is implemented through a standard Taylor rule,
it = ρit−1+(1−ρ)

φpi [Et(pit+1)−pi]+φggt

, ρ ∈ (0,1),φpi > 1,φg ≥ 0. (32)
In equation (32), parameter ρ translates policy inertia. Values φpi and φg are po-
licy parameters. Condition φpi > 1 guarantees, under this model’s specification, the
determinacy of the model, ∀φg ≥ 0.
Our goal is not to pursue a thorough investigation of the model’s dynamics; in-
stead, we will concentrate the analysis in the steady-state. First, we derive the perfect
foresight steady-state equilibrium.
Proposition 3. A perfect foresight steady-state equilibrium for the New-Keynesian
macro model composed by equations (30), (31) and (32) exists, it is unique and it
is given by the pair of values
(pi,g) = φpi
φpi −1+ 1−βκ φg
pi;
φpi
κ
1−β (φpi −1)+φg
pi

.
Proof. Solve the system (30)–(32) under conditions pi ≡ pit = Et(pit+1), g ≡ gt =
Et(gt+1), µt = υt = 0. 
Observe that, as long as the target inflation rate is positive, the values of pi and g
will also be positive, given the condition φpi > 1. If the central bank aims at a zero
inflation rate, the perfect foresight equilibrium implies that not only the inflation rate
but also the output gap are equal to zero. The system of equations allows, as well,
to determine the steady-state value of the nominal interest rate, under conditions of
3 See Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003), for details on the New-Keynesian model.
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perfect foresight, which is i = pi; i.e., in the perfect foresight equilibrium, the real
interest rate is equal to zero.
Next, we need to compute the steady-state not under perfect foresight but under the
sentiment expectations derived in the previous section. As in De Grauwe (2011) we re-
mark that the microfoundations of this model were built under the implicit assumption
that the expectations are rational and that one should be careful when extrapolating the
analysis of the reduced form of the model to a scenario of bounded rationality; as in the
mentioned paper, we follow the arguments in Evans and Honkapohja (2001), in order
to consider it an admissible assumption. We define (pi∗,g∗) as the steady-state that will
hold under the following long-term expectations,
Et(pi∗) = pi∗+(1−2ωt) ψε(pi
∗−pi)
ψ+[ε(pi−pi)]2 , (33)
Et(g∗) = g∗+(1−2ωt) ψη(g
∗−g)
ψ+a [η(g−g)]2 . (34)
Expectations (33) and (34) are steady-state expectation values withdrawn from (28)
and (29) under conditions pi∗ ≡ pit+1 = pit and g∗ ≡ gt+1 = gt . These long-run expecta-
tions have interesting features. Expectations will coincide with observed steady-state
values (what implies long-term perfect foresight) in four possible scenarios: (i) absence
of information costs (ψ = 0); (ii) neutral sentiments (ε = 0;η = 0); (iii) coincidence
between target values and steady-state levels (pi∗ = pi;g∗ = g); (iv) identical number of
pessimists and optimists (ωt = 1/2). In the above expectations, we maintain the time
subscript because share ωt is subject, under the assumption introduced in Section 4, to
perpetual motion.
Proposition 4. The steady-state equilibrium under sentiment cyclicality exists, it is
unique and it is the pair of values

pi∗
g∗

=


ϕ [(φpi −1)Θt +φpi ]+ (Λt −ϕφg) βκΘt

pi−Λtg
ϕ(φpi −1)(1+Θt)+(ϕφg−Λt) 1κ [1−β (1+Θt)]
1
κ [1−β (1+Θt)]pi∗+ βκΘtpi

with Θt ≡ (1−2ωt) ψεψ+[ε(pi−pi)]2 and Λt ≡ (1−2ωt) ψηψ+a[η(g−g)]2 .
Proof. Solve the system (30)–(32) under conditions pi∗ ≡ pit = pit+1, g∗ ≡ gt = gt+1,
µt = υt = 0, and with expectations given by (33) and (34). 
Under Θt = Λt = 0, we confirm that (pi∗,g∗) = (pi,g).
The comparison between the two steady-state results highlights essentially that
cyclical sentiments can transform an otherwise fixed-point steady-state into a regu-
lar fluctuations long-term scenario. However, our setup is not fully deterministic and
we might consider that demand and supply shocks continue to hit the economy in the
long-run. In what follows, we numerically simulate the long-term outcome, compar-
ing the rational expectations setup with the one that assumes sentiments. For such, we
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rewrite the steady-state results without the removal of the exogenous disturbances. We
have:
(i) Rational expectations long-run outcome,
 pig

(µ,υ)
=

φpipi+
φg
κ υt +
1
ϕ µt
φpi −1+ 1−βκ φg
φpipi− φpi−11−β υt + 1ϕ µt
κ
1−β (φpi −1)+φg

(ii) Sentiment expectations long-run outcome,
 pig

(µ,υ)
=


ϕ[(φpi−1)Θt+φpi ]+(Λt−ϕφg) βκ Θt

pi−Λtg+(ϕφg−Λt) 1κ υt+µt
ϕ(φpi−1)(1+Θt )+(ϕφg−Λt) 1κ [1−β (1+Θt )]
1
κ [1−β (1+Θt)]pi∗+ βκΘtpi− 1κ υt

The nature of the shocks is straightforward to understand from the rational expecta-
tions case: positive cost-push shocks rise inflation and lower output; positive demand
shocks rise inflation and make effective output to increase as well, relatively to the
potential level. In order to address business cycles dynamics, we will concentrate
the analysis on the output gap series. Under rational expectations, the only source of
fluctuations is the random realizations of the disturbance variables; in the sentiment
scenario, an additional source emerges: sentiment cyclicality. The example that fol-
lows allows to illustrate how waves of optimism and pessimism imply a change on the
interpretation one can make about long-term fluctuations.
The parameter values selected for the analysis are displayed in Table 1. Those
which have to do directly with the macro model specification (the first row of values)
are withdrawn from Woodford (2003, p. 341, 285); the others are reasonable and plau-
sible values, that do not interfere significantly with the qualitative nature of the results.
Table 1. Parameter values
β = 0.99;ϕ = 6.25;κ = 0.024;φpi = 2;
pi = 0.02;g= 0.01;ψ = 1;ε = 0.175;η = 0.2;a= 0.25
µt ∼ N(0;2.5×10−7);υt ∼ N(0;2.5×10−7)
There is a parameter missing in Table 1. It is the monetary policy parameter asso-
ciated with real stabilization. This is because the parameter has an important role in
determining the results to be obtained and, therefore, to illustrate its relevance we will
work with three different values: φg = 0, φg = 0.25 and φg = 0.5.
Figures 6 and 7 display the long-term trajectories of the output gap, comparing the
rational expectations and the sentiment cycles outcomes. Each figure corresponds to
each one of the cases depicted in Figures 4 and 5 (recall that the difference between the
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Figure 6. Output gap time trajectory: sentiment propagation example 1
two has to do with the values of parameters in the susceptible-spreader-stifler frame-
work). Each figure has three panels that represent, from up to bottom, the cases φg = 0,
φg = 0.25 and φg = 0.5. In each figure, 200 time periods are assumed. In order to
smooth the fluctuations, the presented trajectories are displayed as trend lines over the
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Figure 7. Output gap time trajectory: sentiment propagation example 2
original time-series taking a 4-period moving average. The darker lines correspond to
the trajectories of the output gap under sentiment cyclicality; the brighter ones corre-
spond to the rational expectations outcome.
Both figures show an evident result: the way sentiment cyclicality impacts on ag-
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gregate fluctuations is strongly influenced by the value of parameter φg. Time trajec-
tories in Figure 6 differ from the ones in Figure 7 for just one fundamental reason: the
number of pessimists is, on average, larger than the number of optimists in the case of
Figure 7 and, thus, the output gap is, on average, a lower value on each of the three dis-
played examples. Concentrating the attention on the trajectories provided by Figure 6,
note the following; when monetary authorities show no concern with real stabilization,
sentiment cycles exacerbate both periods of expansion and periods of contraction of the
economy, relatively to the benchmark of rational expectations. This introduces a more
pronounced cyclical movement on a time series that otherwise follows a relatively er-
ratic behavior. As we increase the value of φg, a relevant phenomenon occurs: the
introduction of waves of optimism and pessimism do not generate periods of remark-
able expansions relatively to the case of rational expectations; however, it allows for
the occurrence of strong recessions, in which the trajectory of the output gap departs
significantly from what the rational expectations analysis would predict.
Therefore, through the inspection of the trajectories, we find both a source of strong
recessions and a policy recommendation to avoid them: strong recessions are the result
of a an output stabilization effort on the part of the central bank; in order to avoid them,
monetary authorities should concentrate on the price stability goal.4
Synthesizing, cycles of large amplitude are the result of a series of events that, once
combined, can lead to strong recessions; they are:
(i) The social interaction process that transforms optimists into pessimists and the
opposite, in a recurrent way over time;
(ii) Information costs, that prevent individuals from gaining access, under optimal
conditions, to the knowledge required to formulate rational expectations;
(iii) Price stickiness, which is the main foundation on which the New-Keynesian
model and, in particular, the New-Keynesian Phillips curve is built upon;
(iv) A misdirected monetary policy effort, that puts too much weight on output sta-
bilization.
To gain further insights on the role of waves of optimism and pessimism over the
benchmark New-Keynesian macro model, let us now simultaneously consider both
policy goals: price stability and real stabilization. The following monetary policy
objective function is adapted from Geraats (1999),
Lt =−12 [(pi
∗
t −pi)×100]2+b f ((g∗t −g)×100) . (35)
4 In de Grauwe (2011), it is suggested that the presence of animal spirits will imply that inflation targeting
monetary policy may no longer be optimal and that output stabilization could in fact improve welfare. An-
geletos and La’O (2013) present arguments in the opposite direction: strategic uncertainty coming from an-
imal spirits will contribute to an ineffective policy and, thus, the monetary authority should refrain pursuing
measures that go beyond its main assignment, which is to guarantee price stability. The second interpretation
is closer to the line of reasoning and to the results in this paper.
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In expression (35), pi∗t and g∗t furnish long-term values for inflation and output gap
in the sentiment case; their time series are the ones displayed in Figure 6.5 Parameter
b≥ 0 reflects the weight of output stabilization as a policy goal, relatively to the price
stability objective. Function f is such that f ′′ < 0 and f ′′′ > 0, what signifies that nega-
tive deviations from the output gap target are more penalized than positive deviations,
from the point of view of the central bank’s objective. This is the same as saying that
the central bank has a strong dislike for recessions. An admissible functional form,
which obeys to the specified conditions, is
f ((g∗t −g)×100) = 1− exp

−1
2
(g∗t −g)×100

− 1
2
(g∗t −g)×100. (36)
Note that f (0) = 0, i.e., when the value of the output gap coincides with the target,
then the contribution of the output gap to the objective value Lt is zero. Observe, as
well, that f < 0 for g∗t 6= g , i.e., f (0) is the maximum value of f .
Given objective function (35) and the previously assumed parameter values, to
which we add b = 0.048 (Woodford 2003, p. 431), one can make an inspection about
the role that both policy parameters, φpi and φg, have in allowing for a desirable policy
result. Figure 8 draws the relation between the value of parameter φg and an average
of the value of L over 200 long-term periods, 〈L200〉. Three lines are displayed, for
different values of the other parameter, φpi = 1.95, φpi = 2, φpi = 2.05. The results are
evident: in order to maximize its utility, the central bank will have to choose between
policies according to the following requisites,
(i) The larger the value of φpi , i.e., the more aggressive monetary policy is in terms
of promoting price stability, the higher is the obtained utility;
(ii) Real stabilization policy measures may enhance the utility outcome if it is ap-
plied with moderation. The figure indicates that, for each value of φpi , the value
of φg that maximizes the average value of L is located around φg = 0.2.
Therefore, for a central bank that has, as policy goals, price stability and the avoid-
ance of strong recessions, the effectiveness of its policy is best achieved by adopting an
aggressive attitude relatively to price stability and by addressing, as well, output gap
stabilization concerns, although changes in the interest rate to respond to output gap
fluctuations should be relatively moderate.
Finally, we compare, for a specific policy value φpi = 2, the relation between φg
and 〈L〉 under sentiment cycles and rational expectations. It is evident that the less
intense fluctuations of the rational expectations case generate a better fit relatively to
the designed policy goals, as shown in Figure 9. Thus, prior to specific policy actions,
authorities should address another challenge: how can animal spirits be attenuated. If
animal spirits refer, as pointed out in the introduction, to confidence, fairness and social
attitudes, society should direct its efforts to promote ethical principles and education in
5 The analysis is now restricted to a single case, namely the one in which identical parameter values for the
sentiment switching setup are assumed.
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order to attenuate the intensity of the sentiment switching that underlies the observed
fluctuations on economic aggregates.
7. Conclusion
This paper proposed a foundation for the persistence of fluctuations in the aggregate
sentiment level. Waves of optimism and pessimism alternate as the result of a fully
deterministic dynamic process in which pessimists become optimists and optimists
become pessimists under a susceptible-spreader-stifler sequence.
The cyclical nature of animal spirits, as discussed, can be introduced into a typical
macroeconomic model in order to justify, at least partially, observed business cycles.
The compatibility between the sentiment framework and a description of the macro
environment requires some sort of departure relatively to the rational expectations
paradigm. In this specific case, we consider a setting where the information required to
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form accurate predictions about future events is costly and, thus, agents’ expectations
may deviate from perfect foresight; when this occurs, agents will be optimistic or pes-
simistic about the future performance of the economy, with the shares of optimists and
pessimists determined by the characterized rumor propagation framework.
The setup suggests that, in the long-term, observed fluctuations are strongly de-
termined by sentiment switching with origins in social interaction. In this sense, the
study supports the Keynesian view on animal spirits, that interprets business cycles as
the outcome of forces that have to do with mass psychology much more than with con-
crete economic phenomena. Business cycles are the result of uncontrollable behavioral
factors, and there is not much public authorities can do to avoid cyclical movements
in sentiments, except contributing to a society based on fairness, confidence and social
collaboration and cohesion.
However, the same is not true in what concerns the way sentiments shape expec-
tations and impact on macro variables. Adequate policies to reduce the effect of sys-
tematic sentiment changes over the performance of the economy are essentially those
that (i) reduce the cost of information acquisition; (ii) establish reasonable and realistic
policy targets; (iii) develop monetary policy measures, by manipulating policy parame-
ters, that might fight the undesirable consequences of natural sentiment fluctuations.
The analysis also suggested that, in the context of the New-Keynesian model, a
strong effort to stabilize output may be counterproductive and may generate or perpet-
uate strong recessions. This conclusion is in syntony with a neoclassical interpretation
of monetary policy intervention (i.e., the central bank should concentrate exclusively
on its price stability mandate and avoid real stabilization measures that are often inef-
fective), what places the analysis in this paper in a same class as Angeletos and La’O
(2013): although a Keynesian cornerstone is added to the discussion, the implications
of the analysis are typically neoclassical, with observed cycles being largely deter-
mined by uncontrollable sentiment fluctuations that are due to interaction and com-
munication frictions that cannot be successfully mitigated through direct stabilization
policy intervention.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Applying equilibrium condition v∗−V (v∗) = 0 to system (3), the following chain of
equalities will hold in the steady-state,6
θω (zω)∗ = λω (xω)∗

y1−ω
∗
= σω

y1−ω
∗ 
y1−ω
∗
+

z1−ω
∗
(37)
= θ1−ω

z1−ω
∗
= λ1−ω

x1−ω
∗
(yω)∗ = σ1−ω (yω)∗

(yω)∗+(zω)∗

From (37), it is straightforward the computation of the following equilibrium rela-
tions,
(zω)∗
(z1−ω)∗
=
θ1−ω
θω
(38)
(zω)∗ =
σ1−ω

(yω)∗
2
θω −σ1−ω (yω)∗ (39)
z1−ω
∗
=
σω

y1−ω
∗2
θ1−ω −σω (y1−ω)∗
(40)
(xω)∗ =
σω
λω

y1−ω
∗
+

z1−ω
∗
(41)

x1−ω
∗
=
σ1−ω
λ1−ω

(yω)∗+(zω)∗

(42)
Solving (39) and (40) with respect to (yω)∗ and

y1−ω
∗, respectively, replacing
the results into (41) and (42), and making use of relation (38), one can display steady-
state values (yω)∗,

y1−ω
∗, (xω)∗ and x1−ω∗ as depending solely on (zω)∗. The
expressions are:
(yω)∗ =


1+ 4θωσ1−ω (zω )∗ −1
2
(zω)∗ (43)

y1−ω
∗
=
θω
θ1−ω


1+ 4(θ1−ω )
2
σωθω (zω )∗
−1
2
(zω)∗ (44)
6 Condition yω0 6= 0 ∨ y1−ω0 6= 0 is implicitly assumed.
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(xω)∗ =
σω
λω
θω
θ1−ω


1+ 4(θ1−ω )
2
σωθω (zω )∗
+1
2
(zω)∗ (45)

x1−ω
∗
=
σ1−ω
λ1−ω


1+ 4θωσ1−ω (zω )∗ +1
2
(zω)∗ (46)
Next, we apply condition (xω)∗+

x1−ω
∗
+(yω)∗+

y1−ω
∗
+(zω)∗+

z1−ω
∗
= 1.
This is equivalent to
σω
λω
θω
θ1−ω


1+ 4(θ1−ω )
2
σωθω (zω )∗
+1
2
(zω)∗+ σ1−ωλ1−ω


1+ 4θωσ1−ω (zω )∗ +1
2
(zω)∗
+


1+ 4θωσ1−ω (zω )∗ −1
2
(zω)∗+ θω
θ1−ω


1+ 4(θ1−ω )
2
σωθω (zω )∗
−1
2
(zω)∗
+(zω)∗+
θω
θ1−ω
(zω)∗ = 1 (47)
Equation (47) can be rearranged and presented under the form,
(zω)∗ = 2
 θω
θ1−ω

1+
σω
λω
1+ 4(θ1−ω)2
σωθω (zω)∗
+1
+

1+
σ1−ω
λ1−ω

1+
4θω
σ1−ω (zω)∗
+1
−1
. (48)
Although one cannot solve, in its generic form, equation (48) in order to encounter
an explicit expression for the steady-state value of zωt , it is possible to confirm that a
unique (zω)∗ is the solution of (48). Let F [(zω)∗] represent the r.h.s. of the equation.
The evaluation of the properties of F reveal the following: ∀θω , θ1−ω , λω , λ1−ω ,
σω , σ1−ω ∈ (0,1): lim(zω )∗→0F [(zω)∗] = 0; lim(zω )∗→1F [(zω)∗] ∈ (0,1); F ′[(zω)∗]> 0
and F ′′[(zω)∗] < 0. This set of properties directly implies that F [(zω)∗] intersects line
(zω)∗ in the

(zω)∗ ;F [(zω)∗]

locus once and only once for (zω)∗ ∈ (0,1), what allows
to unequivocally state that a unique solution for (zω)∗ exits.
Given the unique solution for (zω)∗, equations (38) and (43)–(46) guarantee that a
single 6-dimensional array of steady-state values v∗ exists. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
Because parameter values are identical in the cases of pessimistic and optimistic con-
tagion, the model becomes completely symmetric in terms of the associated dynamics
between the two rumor spreading processes. In this case, the steady-state values (xω)∗
and

x1−ω
∗, (yω)∗ and y1−ω∗, (zω)∗ and z1−ω∗ must be identical. Therefore, the
following equilibrium relation holds,
θz∗ = σy∗(y∗+ z∗) = λx∗y∗ (49)
From (49), simple algebra conducts to the results in the proposition, after noticing that
2x∗+2y∗+2z∗ = 1. 
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